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Charles Robb 
The Ways of Things: objects in the studio 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
Conventions of the studio presuppose the artist as the active agent, imposing his/her will 
upon and through objects that remain essentially inert. However, this characterisation of 
practice overlooks the complex object dynamics that underpin the art-making process. Far 
from passive entities, objects are resistant, ‘speaking back’ to the artist, impressing their will 
upon their surroundings. Objects stick to one another, fall over, drip, spill, spatter and chip 
one another. Objects support, dismantle, cover and transform one another. Objects are both 
the apparatus of the studio and its products. It can be argued that the work of art is as much 
shaped by objects as it is by human impulse. Within this alternate ontology, the artist 
becomes but one element in a constellation of objects.  
 
Drawing upon Graham Harman’s Object-Oriented Ontology and a selection of photographs 
of my studio processes, this practice-led paper will explore the notion of agentive objects and 
the ways in which the contemporary art studio can be reconsidered as a primary site for the 
production of new object relationships. 
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Full Paper: 
 
This paper is derived from my current PhD practice-led research project entitled ‘Parentheses 
of Practice: the studio as alter-object’ in which I am seeking to provide an account of the 
agentive forces that arise in the studio as separate from the intentionality the artist.   
 
This project has in part arisen out of the complex of issues presented by my exploration of 
sculptural self-portraiture over the past 15 years. My interest in the portrait bust led me to the 
art criticism of Hans Georg Gadamer and his notion of the ‘occasionality’ of the portrait: the 
necessity of the portrait to refer to the spatio-temporal conditions of its own production and 
reception (Gadamer 2013) (Grondin 2003, 50–51). While I came to Gadamer’s ideas through 
my interest in portraiture, they transformed my thinking about practice in general. As I came 
to see that the ‘occasionality’ of my portrait-making process was encoded as much by the 
portrait-objects as it was by the other ancillary objects that arose during the production 
process.  This saw my attention shift from the self-portrait towards the notion of a ‘portrait’ 
of practice-at-large.  
 
My practice now draws upon a palette of form that is shaped by the generative parameters 
provided by genre (self-portraiture), process (modelling, casting and moulding) and site 
(studio). Exclusively sculptural, the resulting works enable the synthesis of both crafted 
objects and ‘found’ objects that arise in the studio setting. 
 
Owing to the centrality of the object to my sculptural practice, I have found increasingly 
useful the nascent philosophical movement that has come to be known as Object-Oriented 
Ontology (‘OOO’ for short).  This paper will provide a brief overview of the key ideas upon 
which OOO is based before proceeding to apply an ‘object-oriented’ analysis of my studio. 
While I am still developing a full understanding of its capacities as hermeneutical instrument, 
it is already clear that OOO provides a rubric for an analysis of practice that activates the 
‘inert’, enabling the agentive dimension of objects and materials in the studio to be revealed. 
 
 
Object-Oriented Ontology  
A relatively new branch of philosophy, OOO asserts that objects are autonomous, and exist 
independently from the perceiving subject. OOO was pioneered by Graham Harman in his 
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book Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects (2002) in which he examined 
Heidegger’s influential theory of tool-analysis finding within it a philosophical framework 
that ‘gives birth to an ontology of objects themselves’ (2002, 1). Key to this, is Heidegger’s 
influential formulation of the ‘ready-to-hand’ and the ‘present-at-hand’ (Heidegger 1978) – 
terms that describe the two states of objects as they relate to the human subject.  
 
According to Heidegger, ordinarily we engage with objects in instrumental terms that eclipse 
the real existence of the object (‘readiness-to-hand’). As Harman summarises, ‘insofar as the 
tool is a tool, it is quite invisible. And what makes it invisible is the way that it disappears in 
favor of some purpose that it serves’ (2011a, 38). Objects only become ‘visible’ when they 
impede human needs – for example, by becoming an obstacle or being faulty or incomplete 
– at which times we get a glimpse of its real existence as an autonomous entity (‘presence-
at-hand’). None-the-less as the term ‘handedness’ indicates, in both instances there is a 
distance from the subject even as he or she grasps an object; a condition that Harman refers 
to as a ‘withdrawal’. The object’s real existence can never be apprehended for there will 
always remain some aspect of the object that is inaccessible to us; an ‘irreducible darkness’ 
(Morton 2011, 165).  Put simply, try as we might to engage with objects as real entities, we 
can never apprehend all of their qualities, their existence always withdraws from us. 
 
To Harman, the irreducibility of objects to either their qualities or relations to-hand) 
becomes the lynch-pin of Harman’s ontological framework as it allows for the object’s 
autonomy from the human subject. However, just as objects ‘withdraw’ from the human 
subject they also withdraw from other objects: objects do not exist in some independently 
coherent reality from which humans are removed, but are ‘alien’ to each another as well.  
 
Harman’s re-reading of Heidegger has been given added momentum by the philosophy of 
Quentin Meillassoux, who observes that Post-Kantian metaphysics has locked the human and 
the world into a correlationship in which we cannot think of one without reference to the 
other. As he states, correlation is ‘the idea according to which we only ever have access to the 
correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from the 
other’ (Meillassoux 2008, 5). This tension, is so fundamental that it cannot be overcome by 
simply appealing to a reality external to thought (what Harman refers to as ‘naïve realism’) 
(Harman 2011b, 3). And yet science has supplied us with ample evidence of the existence of 
an external world, and one that both unquestionably predates the emergence of homo sapiens. 
 4 
 
To Meillassoux, the challenge of the contemporary philosopher is to reconcile these two 
accounts of the world – realism and idealism - ‘so as to yield absolute knowledge of things 
independent of us, while also avoiding the absolutization of thought found in German 
Idealism’ (Harman 2011b, 9) – in other words, to speculate about the complex contours of 
real existence. Meillassoux’s forceful reorientation of contemporary philosophy by 
reconciling the relationality of Continental philosophy and the scientism of Analytic 
philosophy, has fuelled the drive of OOO towards the analysis of ‘things-in-themselves’ as a 
new philosophical frontier (Harman 2011c, 79). 
 
To move beyond correlationism is to approach what Manuel DeLanda has called a ‘flat 
ontology’: one made exclusively of unique, singular individuals, differing in spatio-temporal 
scale but not in ontological status. (DeLanda 2013, 51). Within this new ontological 
proposal, objects are autonomous, intrinsically strange and unknowable. Investigating the 
‘weirdness’ that proceeds from this new way of considering the world is the basis of OOO as 
a philosophical project. 
 
When viewed in the context of practice-led-research, OOO has the potential to act as a 
powerful exegetical instrument that connects the implicit understandings of the studio to the 
broader philosophical discourses surrounding agency, ontology and contingency. More than 
simply offering a context for the idiosyncratic methodologies of the studio, OOO enables the 
agentive dimension of objects to be apprehended, that is the complex way that objects ‘kick 
back’ (Barad 2007, 214–215), a tendency that most artists are well aware of. 
 
As post-humanist thinkers such as Donna Haraway and Andrew Pickering have explained, 
we tend to conflate agency with subjectivity and intentionality (Haraway 2013) (Pickering 
2010) . In these terms, only humans have agency in a world of inert, passive matter. 
However as Karen Barad explains, agency is not an intrinsic quality, but one that arises 
through activity. When considered as ‘an enactment, not something that someone or 
something has … then it seems not only appropriate but important to consider agency as 
distributed over nonhuman as well as human forms’ (Barad 2007, 214). With this enlarged 
notion of agency in mind, one can assert that just as objects enter into relations with one 
another in ways that are essentially independent of the human subject (for example, by 
connecting, colliding, bending, rubbing, dissolving and unravelling) they can also be said to 
be agentive.  
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As an emergent philosophy, OOO joins the speculative dimension of the art-making process 
as they both lunge into the ‘strangeness of the real – a strangeness undetectable by the 
instruments of common sense’ (Harman 2011b, vii–viii). As a critical instrument in the 
studio, OOO has the capacity to illuminate the deep productive dimensions of practice by 
treating objects not as exemplary of theoretical understandings, but as radical facts in-and-of 
themselves.  
  
What might an ethnography of objects offer to practice?  
 
In thinking through this proposition, I have used the following categories: Production, 
Residue, Arrangement and Association. These four modes of ‘object-oriented’ interaction 
provide a scaffold for the reflection on practice that follows in which I have endeavoured to 
focus exclusively on how objects interact throughout my practice as independent entities.  
 
Production: Objects making objects 
Productive objects are those that assume a parental role (such as moulds which give birth to 
new objects) or a formative one (such as tools).  
 
Parental objects are constituted by the process of lamination and integration. A layered 
object, the mould is created through the brushing and trowelling of coats of material onto the 
surface of an object. This is an effect that is repeated in the casting process whereby multiple 
laminations of resin are applied to the mould, eventually resulting in a new object.  
 
But the mould is also a composite object – a complex of parts whose form is determined by 
the contours of the original object. In the mould-making process, objects are fragmented, 
converted into mould sections which become progressively integrated as the casting process 
ensues.  Here, these parts are given in temporary order by the pressure of other objects: 
clamps, clips and bolts. 
 
Formative objects (such as modelling tools, combs, screeds and sanding discs) refine surfaces 
that may be composed of hundreds of daubs of clay or dozens of cast sections. These 
implements consolidate the object – unifying its components and giving its surface 
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continuity.  Their effect is one of amalgamation – they produce new objects as amalgams of 
pre-existing parts.   
 
Objects are both ingredients and tools that press upon each other to produce new objects. 
 
Residue: Leftover Objects 
The production process frequently sees objects arise as the result of the integration of parts. 
But practice also involves the counter-process of disintegration: the generation of objects as a 
residue or by-product. The pressure of another object may hold a composite object together, 
but it may also result in the separation of its parts: casts shed their silicone skins, clay gathers 
in palm-sized clumps (Fig. 5), unused materials cure in the bottoms of containers, moulds 
dismantle, chip and tear. Offcuts and fragments gather in tidal contours around objects.  
 
These residual objects form a record of the production process. They act as temporary 
documents of object-interactions while also setting forth new object relationships: chips of 
plaster are preserved in resin spills, dust and filings are caught on the gummed surfaces of 
silicone offcuts, charged polyester particles stick to plastic sheeting. Dust also articulates the 
horizontal planes of the studio environment as it gathers on light housings, benchtops, shelves 
and floor. These particle-objects signal the parallel object-binding forces of gravity and 
electromagnetism.  
 
Taken together, these piles, lumps and particles of objects comprise the apeiron of practice – 
the original indeterminate mass from which the Pre-Socratics thought all objects were 
derived and to which all objects ultimately return (Moore 1991, 17–19) (Kimbell 2013, 106). 
This field of amorphous residue is a generative document of the formation of objects as well 
as their disintegration.  
 
Arrangement: Situated Objects 
The arrangement of objects (tools, materials, forms and residue) that occurs during the 
making process comprises a third order of object relationships in the studio. Informal and 
incidental arrangements arise continually during the making process and influence the 
configurations of the resulting compositions/arrangements. These configurations are ‘cued’ 
by provisional arrangements observed in the studio but they are also directed by the physical 
properties of the objects and how can they be balanced, stacked, propped, wedged, nested and 
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reoriented. Smaller objects balance in the grooves or clefts of others; the shape and texture of 
surfaces determines their angle of placement on top of one another; the precise conditions of 
counter support frequently directs the final arrangement of forms. The resulting compositions 
often comprise a discrete system, with the removal of a single component resulting in 
structural collapse. 
 
This has the effect of renewing the object by decoupling it from the highly directed processes 
of modelling and casting and allowing its formal and material properties to influence the final 
form. Once cast, the object loses its working orientation to become a module with its own 
formal integrity. These properties can facilitate new orientations and invite or cue new formal 
relations with other objects. 
 
The object becomes a mobile element presenting both new possibilities for the way it is 
positioned in space and new connective possibilities with other works.  
 
Association: The ‘likeness’ of objects 
Just as objects might propose their own spatial relations in the studio – objects also ‘cue’ one 
another based on visual resemblance. Increasingly, my selection of objects to cast and/or 
model is determined by their resemblance to elements already at play within my pre-existing 
formal palette. These forms include: circular, heptagonal, necked, truncated, amorphic, 
undulating and composite shapes; with each form in this typology having developed 
generatively (and sometimes elliptically) from the portrait bust format.  As objects enter my 
studio’s archive of form, their individual qualities in turn provide further points of reference 
and so the formal vocabulary of the work expands. 
 
Given that my practice has used the self-portrait as a foundation for more than a decade, these 
patterns of ‘likeness’, whereby two distinct objects are drawn into a state of visual 
equivalence, can be read as an enlargement of the mimetic program – the representational 
system central to the ontology of the self-portrait in which the object is forever tethered to an 
external subject. Here the dichotomy of subject-object that underpins the ontology of the 
portrait as genre is dispersed across multiple object-object relationships. 
 
 
Summary 
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As N. Katherine Hayles explains, OOO gives emphasis to ‘an object’s allure, the attraction it 
emanates for other objects’ (Hayles, N. Katherine 2014, 168). The alluring qualities of 
objects are an intrinsic aspect of my making process as tools, materials and residue combine 
to produce new objects and in turn new object-relationships. When seen from the perspective 
of this ‘flat ontology’, the studio becomes reconfigured as a site for the interplay of human 
and non-human agency – forces of attraction and resistance that occur between all the 
elements of practice.  If, as OOO urges, we resist seeing the artist as the central agentive 
force in the studio, then we can begin to acknowledge the network of material-, object- and 
process-based forces that exert themselves upon the creative process. Seen in this way, 
practice becomes an agentive field comprised of a multitude of impulses that shape and direct 
the artist’s behaviour in the studio. 
 
As Harman observes in The Third Table, his short essay for dOCUMENTA(13), artists 
‘attempt to establish objects deeper than the features through which they are announced, or 
allude to objects that cannot quite be made present’ (Harman 2013, 14). To Harman, the artist 
grapples with objects on a more fundamental level than that provided by either scientific or 
constructivist accounts of reality. This is because art is never simply an index or image of the 
real but a real thing in-and-of-itself. Art is a reality generator, forging new entities born of the 
interplay of physical and cultural processes but not limited to them. Put another way, the 
polysemy of the work of art makes it a special class of object, one that acts not simply as a 
representation but a manifestation of the complex ‘depths’ of objects.  
 
Seen from the perspective of OOO, the artist can be said to act as an ‘onto-naut’, a voyager 
through the ‘irreducible darkness’ of objects. It is this speculative attitude that guides the 
handling and observation of objects in my sculptural practice. 
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